DRAFT DCI BRIEFING FOR VINSON SUBCOMMITTEE

Soviet Military Developments

- I. When we look at all the activities taking place in the area of Soviet military developmental work, the picture that emerges is one of a broad, balanced dynamic program moving forward steadily in several fields at the same time:
 - ∠--New ICBMs are being tested.
 - -- New systems are under construction at the Tyuratam test center.
 - ∠--A new ICBM deployment concept is beginning.
 - u --New facilities are being constructed at nuclear materials production plants.
 - -- New electronics installations -- possibly related to an anti-satellite mission -- are being built.
 - -- New defensive missile installations are under construction.
 - √A. It is evident that the Soviets are continuing to invest heavily in the qualitative
 - capability against the US and in their strategic defenses.

- 1. Much of their effort may not reach fruition in the next several years. This should not blind us, however, to its eventual impact on the offensive and defensive systems of the US.
- II. Over the past several months we have been getting increasing evidence that a new generation of Soviet ICBMs is being developed.
 - √A. You will recall that the last time I briefed you we had determined that the Soviets were testing two new missiles, which we now call the SS-9 and the SS-10.
 - B. Three Soviet missile range instrumentation ships are now in the Pacific to monitor long range firings of ICBMs. They are generally in position south of Johnston Island and Moscow has issued a warning to avoid two impact areas there from today until the end of the year.
 - √1. One of the impact areas is farther from

 Tyuratam than any previously used--7,000

 nautical miles.
 - $\sqrt{2}$. We expect the Soviets to test the SS-9, and possibly the more untried SS-10 over

55-6 14

-2-

these extended ranges. They might also try extended range firings of their established ICBMs from operational sites.

- C. We have recently identified six single, dispersed silos under construction at Tyuratam.

 One of these silos is shown on the board you seen now. (NPIC Board # 1306) It is obvious that the Soviets are vigorously pushing this mode of deployment.
- plexes have their launchers deployed in clusters of two or three, which make it possible for several to be destroyed by a single nuclear blast. The Soviets may be curtailing this mode of deployment.

 (See Map of Soviet ICBM complexes)
 - 1. We recently have had to reduce our count of the number of Soviet ICBM launchers. We formerly listed 238 operational or under construction, but currently are down to 230.
 - 2. Several SS-7 and SS-8 sites begun last year appear to have been abandoned, at the least, construction has been halted from some time.

- 3. Of the above, we estimate that 190 are operational.
- √E. We now have discovered what we believe to be a new ICBM complex under construction in an area 80 miles south of Semipalatinsk the first new complex in about two years. (Show board of Zhangiz Tobe)
 - 1. In the new complex the silos under construction are dispersed in a single silo pattern, similar to those under development at Tyuratam. The SS-9 or another new missile probably will be deployed at this site.
 - 2. The silo is bigger in diameter than others we have seen, which could mean that it is designed to launch the missile without first raising it to the surface.
 - 3. If this pattern is extended to other parts of the Soviet Union, it will, of course, greatly increase the number of aiming points for the US strike force.

III. The USSR also is expanding production of materials needed to manufacture nuclear weapons.

25X1

of what I

IV. We are becoming concerned with the possibility that the Soviets are moving to develop an anti-satellite capability.

NA. They are aware of our satellite reconnaissance program, and from their own experience with

satellite reconnaissance vehicles they probably have gotten some idea of how successful we have been.

- B. We would expect them to be developing ways of denying us this type of information.
- C. Recently we have seen the beginnings of construction of large, expensive electronics installations, both deep in the USSR and on its periphery.
 - v1. These installations appear to be phased array radars and may have satellite tracking functions.
 - 2. One of them, located at Olenegorsk, may also be a ballistic missile early warning radar. (Board 1849)
 - 3. The fact that one of the installations is located at the Sary Shagan antimissile test center suggests that the Soviets may intend to use them as ABM acquisition radars as well. (Board 2777)
- V. As for Soviet defense, two defensive missile installations are under construction in the general Leningrad-Moscow area. (Board 2778 and 2779)

 They appear to be designed for long range, surface-to-air intercept of aircraft and standoff

weapons like our HOUND DOG air-to-surface missile.

- A. We have evidence suggesting that one of the three sites making up the probable ABM complex at Leningrad will have one of these new SAM complexes. (Board 2081)
 - 1. However, we believe that, temporarily at least, the Soviets are abandoning their efforts to install an ABM system around Leningrad. Even if ABM construction were to resume now, it is unlikely that a system could become operational before 1966.
- B. Work on the suspect ABM system around Moscow continues. The large inverted V-shaped radar being built south of the city could be part of the Moscow system. (Board 1265)
- VI. The Soviet Navy lately seems to be more willing to see the sea than it has in the past. There have been a number of long-range nuclear submarine patrols by Pacific and Northern Fleet units.
 - A. In addition, ships and submarines from all three Western fleets--Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea--have been conducting exercises in the Mediterranean since mid-June.

- B. The Soviets now have an initial operational capability for a submerged launch ballistic missile, with at least two such submarines in commission. In contrast to our POLARIS system, each submarine apparently has only three tubes, and the range of the missile is much shorter—about 700 nautical miles.
- C. The Soviet submarine fleet appears to be putting its present emphasis on both nuclear and conventional submarines armed with cruise missiles.
 - 1. There now are about 30 of these boats in commission, capable of launching missiles from the surface to a range of about 450 miles. They could be used to engage either surface fleets or shore targets.
 - 2. The cruise-missile boats are getting bigger and bigger. A class with six launchers has been succeeded by types with eight launchers. Just recently, we photographed a submarine at Severomorsk which appears to be big enough and long enough to be a nuclear submarine with 10 cruise-missile tubes. (Board 1420)

- D. All construction appears to have stopped on submarines which fire ballistic missiles from the surface.
- E. The Soviets now have over 30 nuclear submarines of various types in service. They have overcome some of the bugs that plagued the nuclear subs at the outset, but it still appears that a surface tender accompanies each nuclear boat on out-of-area cruises.

VII. In the ground forces picture

25X1

growing evidence that

organized. Some withdrawals of Soviet troops 23 formany may be taking place.

- \sqrt{A} . We would expect Khrushchev to seek some \sqrt{A} diplomatic and propaganda mileage from such a move.
- B. The troops might be discharged to ease military costs and help the Soviet manpower shortage.
 - It is conceivable, of course, as the bitterness between Moscow and Peiping increases, that additional Soviet troops might be shifted to the border with Communist China.

might be s

25X1

-9-

C. The air and ground forces of the Eastern

Europe countries have recently been get
ting increased amounts of modern equipment

from the Soviet Union. This could mean that

the Soviets feel the need to improve the

capabilities of the satellite ground forces

in anticipation of a somewhat decreased

role in Eastern Europe for Soviet troops.

y y III

I mentioned in June that the outer space probe the Soviets launched on April 2--which they called ZOND I--probably was intended as a Venus mission and should arrive there about July 20.

- A. The Soviets never did call it a Venus mission, although they claimed to have made two mid-course corrections putting the probe on a proper course.
- and apparently the probe did too. As far as we can tell, communications failed again, denying the Soviets any information on Venus which they could have used for a propaganda triumph.

(ishur hard

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt